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ABSTRACT 
Because many environmental problems are associated with the 
production and use of energy, it is not surprising that the effects of 
policies in the two areas are often interdependent. This paper 
explores the interactions between the feasibility of an ef ficient 
market for emissions permits for sulfur oxides and the current state 
of air pollution, public utility and natural gas regulation. It shows 
how some of the opposition to tradable emissions permits can be traced 
to proposals to implement the reforms that redistribute wealth and the 
burden of regulatory uncertainty in ways that have greater economic 
impact than the potential eff iciency gains of a market approach. It 
also examines how a tradable permits market and other regulatory 
reforms can be designed so as to avoid most of these problems. 
TRADABLE AIR POLLUTION PERMITS IN THE OVERALL REGULATORY SYSTEM: 
PROBLEMS OF REGULATORY INTERACTIONS 
* 
Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. Noll 
Since 1 977,  the Environmental Protection Agency has been 
developing and implementing an ever-widening number of so-called 
"controlled trading options " for air pollution control. The idea of 
these plans is to introduce a limited form of a market into the 
allocation of emissions among sources of air pollution. Starting with 
existing source-specific standards as a baseline, policies such as 
bubbles , emissions banks, netting and off sets allow firms to negotiate 
� 
within limits -- trades of emissions so as to f ind a way of 
satisfying air quality standards at lower total costs. These trades, 
once agreed upon by the parties, are then normally proposed to 
regulators as amendments to the existing set of source-specific 
standards. 1 
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A natural next step in reforming air pollution regulation 
would be to move all of the way to a true tradable emissions permits 
system. Regulators adopting tradable emissions permits in the purest 
form would no longer set source-specific technical standards as a 
baseline for further trades. Instead. the job of the regulator would 
be to set overall ambient air quality standards, to limit total 
emissions in each geographic region so that these standards were 
satisfied, to organize the market institutions that would be used to 
allocate emissions among sources, and to enforce the overall standard 
by detecting and fining sources that emit more pollutants than their 
holdings of permits allow. 
In this paper we will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of 
the workability of an efficient market in tradable emissions permits. 
Our purpose is to explore the narrower topic of how the political 
feasibility and economic efficiency of tradable permits is affected by 
the status quo ante of the regulatory environment in which permits 
markets are being developed. Before turning to this central issue, 
however, the principal attractions and potential problems of a market 
for emissions permits will be briefly sunnnarized. 
A pure tradable emissions permits system has a number of 
theoretical advantages, the most important of which are as follows. 2 
First, assuming that businesses seek to minimize costs, a competitive 
market for permits achieves any given emissions target at minimum 
total cost. By contrast, environmental regulators are unlikely to 
possess sufficiently precise information about abatement technologies 
to find the minimum-cost strategy for achieving their environmental 
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object ives. Moreover, the separation of authority over different 
types of sources among federal, state and local regulators erects a 
barrier to finding efficient trade-offs of emissions between sources 
that are regulated by different governmental entities. A second 
advantage of tradable permits is that they ease the adoption of new 
abatement technology and the entry and exit of pollution sources. 
With source-specific regulation, every new source and every new 
abatement technology must obtain specific regulatory approval. This 
inhibits the adoption of more efficient technologies and restricts 
change by raising the cost of innovation. By contrast, a tradable 
permits system makes emissions more like other inputs to a production 
process, namely, they must be acquired through a market. To the 
extent that a permits market is "thick" - that is, characterized by 
easily arranged transactions at predictable prices the problem of 
acquiring new permits (or selling old ones) would not be materially 
different than the problems of participating in markets for labor, raw 
materials , land, or other inputs. The third advantage of tradable 
permits is that they avoid some of the costs of the regulatory process 
itself. Regulators no longer need devote most of their resources to 
identifying specific technical fixes for a long list of emissions 
sources, nor to undertaking a protracted case for changing standards 
for any particular source. Regulated firms need no longer undergo the 
costs of preparing materials to defend their positions in these same 
proceedings. 
Whether these theoretical advantages are, in fact, practically 
available depends upon the validity of the assumption that a market 
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for emissions permits will be feasible. Among the feasibility issues 
are legal questions relating to the establishment of an emissions 
baseline for sources from which trades can be made, and to the choice 
of methods for monitoring and enforcing the permits. There are also 
issues related to the economic performance of the market for permits. 
Competitive markets require a sufficiently large number of buyers and 
sellers such that none has a large enough share of the market to 
extract significant monopoly profits from it. Consequently, whether a 
permits market is feasible is in part an empirical question that turns 
on the number, geographic distribution and abatement cost functions of 
sources in a region, on the technical relationship between emissions 
and pollution, and on the specific legal and institutional features of 
the permits market. We have examined these issues for a specific 
pollutant (atmospheric sulfate particulates) in a specific airshed 
(Los Angeles) , and concluded that it is likely that an efficient 
permits market could be designed to solve that particular problem.3 
Unfortunately, legal, technical and economic feasibility are 
not the only issues to be resolved. Implementing tradable emissions 
permits faces further barriers because it must take place in a context 
in which other regulatory programs strongly affect the performance of 
a permits market and the attitudes of regulated firms, regulators, 
environmentalists, and the general public, 
This paper examines three such interactions, each of which 
illustrates how existing regulatory policy affects the feasibility of 
an efficient market for emissions permits. One problem is that the 
current status of overall regulation establishes certain wealth 
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positions of firms that are subject to environmental regulation and 
that would have to participate in a permits market, How these wealth 
positions would be altered, if at all, by a permits market will affect 
the desirability of this reform to polluting firms, and hence the 
political resistance to it that they can be expected to put forth. 
Although inefficient, the present system of source-specific 
regulations establishes implicit property rights in emissions among 
old sources. A tradable permits program can threaten these wealth 
positions, and thereby can severely limit the range of politically 
feasible market institutions for implementing tradable permits. This 
problem is addressed in the next section. 
A second issue of regulatory interaction is the relationship 
of environmental policy to energy regulation. Nearly all air 
pollution is caused by processing and burning hydrocarbon fuels. 
Consequently, policies affecting the price and availability of fuels 
will affect the severity of environmental problems and the cost of 
abating them. Section II of this paper examines the relationship 
between a tradable permits program in Los Angeles for dealing with 
sulfate particulates and the status of natural gas regulation. The 
price and availability of natural gas are the most important factors 
influencing the cost of abatement of sulfur oxides emissions in Los 
Angeles, and constitute the single greatest source of uncertainty in 
environmental policy in that region. 
The third example of regulatory interactions is the effect of 
public utility regulation on the performance of incentive-based 
reforms. Approximately half ot sulfur oxides emissions in Los 
6 
Angeles, and a larger proportion in some other regions, is from 
electric power generation facilities. Electric utilities are heavily 
regulated by public utilities commissions, which control prices and 
profits by making decisions about the amount of costs that a utility 
is permitted to recover from its ratepayers. Whether an electric 
utility will respond to an incentive-based regulatory reform like 
tradable emissions permits in an efficient manner depends upon the 
treatment of various forms of enviromnental costs and incentives by 
public utility ratemakers. This topic is examined in Section III. 
Because institutional problems are man-made, they pose no 
insurmountable barrier , in principle, to the implementation of 
tradable emissions permits. Nevertheless, they illustrate that reform 
of one domain of regulation can easily be frustrated by other 
regulatory policies, and that the feasibility of effective reform can 
depend upon dealing simultaneously with other sources of inefficiency 
in the overall structure of regulation. In particular, for the case 
of tradable permits for sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles, 
erstwhile reformers must take account of these issues to bring off a 
successful reform. 
I. EXISTING STANDARDS AS CONSTRAINTS ON REFORM 
The genesis of EPA's controlled trading options is in the 
dilemma facing regions that are not in compliance with ambient air 
quality standards. In these regions, no additional emissions can be 
created; however, a zero em issions standard for new or expanding 
sources would essentially preclude any economic expansion as well as 
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the possibility of competitive entry. Hence, enviromnental regulators 
developed the offset policy, a procedure whereby new and expanding 
sources of pollution could satisfy the zero-emissions requirement by 
abating pollution elsewhere in the region, rather than constructing a 
facility that actually produced no emissions. The major constraint 
placed upon these firms was the requirement to satisfy the new source 
performance standards (NSPS) . In regions that were not in compliance 
with federal ambient air quality standards, the NSPS require 
achievement of the Lowest Achievable :Emissions Rate (LAER) . This is 
distinguished from the Best Available Control Technology (BACT), which 
is applied to new sources in regions that are in compliance with 
ambient air quality standards but that are so-called PSD (Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration) regions. The distinction between LAER 
and BACT, although of debatable practical significance, was intended 
to convey the policy intention that firms would not be allowed to 
reduce emissions from old sources to satisfy the zero-emissions limit 
in polluted regions until every conceivable technical control had been 
applied to the new facility. As a political matter, the point was to 
assure environmentalists that tradability of emissions permits would 
not be a vehicle for introducing a significant relaxation of emissions 
limits or for undermining the possibility that a region would achieve 
air quality objectives. 
The precursor of controlled trading was the bubble policy. 
Regulators normally set standards for each point at a facility where 
emissions escape; hence, a complicated production facility can have 
numerous separately regulated sources. The bubble policy allowed a 
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firm to treat all of the sources at one facility as if they were one 
combined source, and adopt any technical methods that would reduce 
total emissions � even if that meant allowing emissions to increase 
at some of the sources. In essence, this permits a single plant to be 
treated as a tiny tradable permits market. in which the owners of the 
plant can make trades of emissions among sources as long as the result 
is a reduction in total emissons. 
The offset and bubble policies had two important consequences. 
The first was that they gave de facto, although implicit, recognition 
to the fact that giving a firm a permit to operate if it is in 
compliance with regulatory standards conveys a limited property right. 
Standards, once promulgated, establish the share of a firm in the 
overall emissions limit for a region, just as a real estate 
acquisition conveys to the firm a share in the total amount of land 
that is zoned for a particular use. Of course, the limitations and 
conditions -- and the degree of security in the property right -­
differ between permits to emit and title to the land, 4 but because 
having a permit is clearly superior to not having one (indeed, it is 
essential to operations, just as is having rights to use the land) , 
the permit constitutes a valuable asset to a firm. 
Making permits tradable, even in the limited form allowed in 
the bubble policy or the offset policy for new sources, enhances their 
value. If standards at a plant are economically inefficient in that 
marginal abatement costs differ among sources, bubbles allow the firm 
to shuffle permits among its sources so as to reduce total compliance 
costs -- and hence enhance the value of the company. And, as long as 
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incremental abatement costs at old sources are lower than they are for 
new sources that are in compliance with NSPS � a condition that is 
guaranteed by the LAER standard � the offset policy enhances the 
value of permits by allowing them to be sold for more than the 
counterbalancing costs of further abatement. 
The significance of the property rights that are implicit in 
emissions permits is that they play a major role in determining the 
politics of changes in environmental policy. To the extent that 
political participation and hence the feasible set of changes in 
policy -- is determined by the economic stakes in the policy of 
various parties that are affected by it, the very existence of a 
standard-setting process establishes constraints on feasible reforms. 
Ackerman and Hassler have argued that the new source performance 
standards for coal-fired power plants were written into the Clean Air 
Act Amendments because of the beneficial effect the standards would 
have on eastern coal interests and the value of established firms 
already holding permits.5 Crandall adds the additional insight that 
the winning political coalition for NSPS included Northeastern and 
Midwestern interests that were trying to slow the growch of the 
Sunbelt states.6 These are specific examples of a more general 
feature of the existing approach to air pollution regulation: source­
specific standards, although they are something to resist when they 
are being written, can become a valuable asset to an established firm 
because they give old sources a cost advantage over new ones, erect an 
entry barrier to potential competitors, and. with controlled trading 
options in place, may eventually be sold for more than the cost of an 
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offsetting amount of further abatement. Any reform proposal that 
undermines these valuable attributes of existing permits is likely to 
face resistance from industrial polluters who already hold permits. 
Of course, the importance of the constraints created by 
existing regulation turns on the empirical significance of the wealth 
held in permits compared to the reductions in overall abatement costs 
that a market in permits could produce. Our work on the likely 
effects of implementing tradable emissions permits for sulfur oxides 
emissions in Los Angeles indicates that the wealth inherent in permits 
is indeed quite large, probably much larger than the efficiency gains 
to be captured by the system. Figure 1 shows the demand curve for a 
permit to emit a ton of so2-equivalent in Los Angeles for one day. 
The demand curve is calculated by estimating the abatement cost 
function for each source category in Los Angeles, and solving for the 
cost-minimizing distribution of emissions among sources for each 
ceiling on total emissions (abscissa of Figure 1 is possible ceilings 
on total emissions) . Underlying these calculations are two 
assumptions: that the market for permits is competitive and hence 
achieves a g iven emissions target at mini.mum total cost, and that use 
of natural gas as a boiler fuel is somewhat constrained below the 
market-clearing quantity at deregulated prices, as has been the case 
during the early 1980s owing to the remaining vestiges of price and 
allocation regulation of natural gas. The standards currently in 
place allow approximately 350 tons per day of so2-equivalent to be 
released into the atmosphere in Los Angeles. As can be seen in the 
figure, at 350 tons per day, a permit to emit one ton for one day 
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would b e  worth $470. which translates to a permit value of over 
$170,000 if the holder can emit a ton per day for an entire year. 
Thus. the cumulative value of permits to emit 350 tons per day for a 
year is approximately $60 mil lion. By contrast, total annual 
compliance costs under the distribution of permits by a market would 
total an estimated $123 mil lion, and the efficiency gain from a market 
� the reduction in estimated compliance costs from correcting current 
inefficiencies �would be less than $10 mil lion. 7 The significance 
of these numbers is that to date sulfur regulation in Los Angeles has 
created a new property right -- a permit to emit -- that is half as 
valuable as the compliance costs that have been undertaken to meet the 
standard, and that is roughly ten times as valuable as the short-run 
efficiency gains to be derived from making it freely tradable. 
These numbers provide the basis for the resistance of industry 
to the most straightforward methods for introducing incentive-based 
approaches to environmental regulation: either an emissions tax or an 
auction of emissions permits. According to our calculations, the 1980 
concentration of sul fate particulates in Los Angeles could be obtained 
if all standards were abandoned and a emissions tax were adopted equal 
to approximately twenty-five cents per pound of so2-equivalent 
emissions. Alternatively, the state could auction off permits to emit 
350 tons per day. The net result of either policy would be to 
transfer approximately $60 million a year from existing pollution 
sources to the state with no attendant improvement in air quality and 
with only a few mil lion dollars of reduction in total annual 
expenditures on abatement. 
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Al lowing present polluters to keep all $60 million per year in 
the value of existing emissions is not, of course, a firm pol itical 
constraint on the feasible set of environmental reforms. It is more 
of a factor to be considered i'n the design of a process for 
implementing tradable permits. The current approach. which uses 
existing standards as the basel ine from which trades can be made, is 
political ly attractive because it essentially grandfathers the wealth 
position of current permit holders. Unfortunately, simply to 
grandfather permits and let polluters arrange trades is not the most 
efficient way to organize a market: it requires bilateral 
negotiations, it does not produce a mechanism whereby transactions 
terms become matters of public record (and hence convey meaningful 
information to potential participants in the market) , and it can cause 
severe market structure problems. In Los Angeles, our calculations 
indicate that the strategy of grandfathering produces a market that is 
highly concentrated on the demand side. 
If the only feasible market institution for implementing 
tradable permits were the method of grandfathering and letting 
polluters orchestrate trades by negotiating from the baseline of 
current emissions, the prospects for this reform would be gloomy. 
Fortunate ly, an alternative is available: a "Zero Revenue Auction." 
The details of this arrangement are presented elsewhere; however, the 
basic idea is to al locate permits provisionally on the basis of 
current emissions, but to require al l firms to submit a demand curve 
for permits, the sum of which will then be used to make the final 
al location.8 The market price of a permit is determined by the 
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intersection of the cumulative demand curve with the ceiling on total 
emissions. Each firm then pays an amount equal to the permit price 
times its final allocation. and receives back an amount equal to the 
price times its provisional allocation. Net payments to the state are 
zero for all firms taken together, and for each firm, a net payment 
differing from zero represents an improvement from the status quo ante 
in terms of the sum of abatement costs plus net permit payments as 
long as the firm truthfully reports its demand curve. This 
institution preserves the wealth inherent in existing permits, 
provides a thick market with low transactions costs , results in a 
public price signal for future reference by firms contemplating entry 
or expansion of polluting facilities, and attacks the market structure 
problem by placing all firms on the same (demand) side of the market. 
Its only drawback would be that it is somewhat more difficult to 
understand than simple grandfathering , and has the feature that 
participation in the market is coerced, rather than voluntary --
al though firms could guarantee a final allocation equal to the 
provisional one at no net cost by reporting a perfectly inelastic 
demand at the provisional quantity. Thus , it would appear that the 
barriers created by current regulations can be worked around. 
II. NATURAL GAS REGULATION 
The calculations in the preceding section were based upon a 
specific assumption about the availability of natural gas. That price 
regulation of natural gas at the wellhead has led to excess demand is 
well documented.9 And , as regulation of natural gas (especially new 
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discoveries) has relaxed, supplies have increased. Natural gas is 
especially attractive for use in regions suffering from heavy air 
pollution, for it is exceptionally clean burning. For the problem at 
hand � sulfate particulates controls in Los Angeles -- it is 
at tractive because it contains virtually no sulfur. Hence, 
substitution of gas for oil � the principal fuel burned in Los 
Angeles boilers � is the least expensive abatement strategy available 
for any source that can burn gas instead of oil. 
The importance of the availability of natural gas is 
illustrated by Table 1, which shows the annual abatement cost for 
satisfying various limits on total emissions under three different 
assumptions about the availability of natural gas. The "Low" and 
"High" natural gas cases pertain to two different projections of the 
supply of natural gas that were made in the mid-1970s.10 The low 
availability case represents the predictions then being made about gas 
supplies in the 1980s, and reflects the view then common that gas 
supplies would continue to dwindle. Shortly before the development of 
the "gas bubble" in the late 1970s, gas supplies in Los Angeles were 
approaching this level. 
The high supply case represents a relatively minor shortfall 
of supplies from market-clearing quantities at deregulated prices. It 
is much closer to the reality of 1980 -- the middle column of the 
table � than the low availability case. All three cases presume that 
existing regulations regarding priorities of user classes, rather than 
the market , will be used to allocate gas. This assigns highest 
priority to residential users , and lowest priority to electric 
SULFUR OXIDES I 
EMISSIONS 
(tons/day) I 
I 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
450 
TABLE 1 
ANNUAL ABATEMENT COSTS
(In Millions of 1977 Dollars) 
NATURAL GAS SUPPLY 
Low Actual 1 980 
622 1 82 
566 158 
524 144 
487 131 
459 123 
440 1 14 
424 106 
High 
109 
93 
81 
7 2  
64 
56 
49 
16 17 
generation facilities. In the low and high availability cases , we 
assigned gas to categories of users according to these priorities. 
The 1980 case reflects the average pattern of use that actually took 
place, which may have departed slightly from the assignment we have 
assumed to the extent that supplies and demands varied through the 
year. In each case we have assumed that the price of natural gas 
equals the BTU-equivalent price of high-sulfur residual fuel oil. In 
fact, gas prices have been somewhat lower than this, so that the 
availability of natural gas has produced even greater cost savings 
than are shown in the table. 
As discussed above, emissions in Los Angeles currently range 
between 325 and 350 tons per day, annual average. This brings Los 
Angeles essentially into compliance with the relevant federal ambient 
air quality standards for so2 and for total suspended particulates. 
However, approximately a third of the degradation in visibility in Los 
Angeles is still due to sulfate particulates, and sulfur compounds are 
a major component of local incidences of acid rain and acid fog. 
Consequently, the state has set an ambient air quality standard for 
sulfate particulates that is substantially more rigorous than the 
federal standards, and that would require a reduction in emissions to 
an estimated 150 tons per day. Alternatively, a reduction to 250 tons 
per day would cause the region to be out of compliance with the state 
standard about three weeks per year. By contrast, existing standards 
under the assumption of low natural gas availability -- the conditions 
that were threatened in the mid-1970s -- would produce emissions of 
about 420 tons per day. These various outcomes � from existing 
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standards and low natural gas to compliance with state ambient air 
quality standards -- explain the motivation for the range of emissions 
ceilings considered in Figure 1 and Table 1. 
As is apparent from Table 1, the effect of the availability of 
natural gas is dramatic. Achieving the state standard under the high-
availability case is approximately one-fourth as expensive as 
maintaining the status quo if natural gas supplies are curtailed to 
the low-availability case. Or, if gas supplies increase from the 
actual 1980 case to the high-availability situation, state standards 
can be satisfied while simultaneously reducing compliance costs by an 
estimated $14 million. Obviously, the future of environmental policy 
in Los Angeles -- and in other regions in which natural gas can be an 
important substitute fuel for coal or oil -- depends heavily on the 
availability of natural gas. 
Environmental compliance costs will also depend upon the price 
of natural gas. Several studies have been undertaken to forecast the 
effect of total deregulation of natural gas on its price. These 
studies provide a variety of estimates, but most predict that, if gas 
were deregulated in the early 1980s, by 1990 the price would rise, but 
not all the way to the BTU-equivalent price for very low-sulfur 
residual fuel oil (.25 percent sulfur content) that is now required in 
Los Angeles for electric utilities. For example, the forecast by the 
Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis of the Department of Energy 
forecasts a 1990 price slightly less than halfway between high-sulfur 
and low-sulfur residual fuel oil prices, whereas the Energy 
Information Administration in the same department forecasts that gas 
will never reach even high-sulfur residual fuel oil prices in most 
11 parts of the country. 
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The cost of compliance with environmental regulations depends 
crucially on the cost of natural gas in relation to residual fuel oil 
for those firms that can make the substitution. Table 2 illustrates 
this point by showing our estimates of the market-clearing price of a 
permit to emit a ton of sulfur in Los Angeles under four different 
assumptions about the price of gas in a deregulated environment and 
under the three cases discussed above in which the price of natural 
gas is below the market-clearing level but supplies are partially 
curtailed (the high, low and actual 1980 cases) . The price of a 
permit in competitive equilibrium equals the marginal cost of 
abatement; hence these price differences directly reflect the effect 
of natural gas prices and availability on abatement costs.12 
A firm that is subject to environmental regulation faces 
several sources of uncertainty in relation to the natural gas 
situation. There is an underlying uncertainty created by the presence 
of regulation during the past twenty years. By artificially 
restraining wellhead prices, and by causing a shortage, regulation has 
deprived firms of information about the performance of a deregulated 
market. Consequently, uncertainties about the future under 
deregulation are greater than they otherwise would be. Finally, there 
is uncertainty about the future state of gas regulation. Whereas the 
current policy is gradually to move towards full deregulation, it is 
by no means certain that gas will never again be regulated. The 
history of the past forty years is one of episodic swings between more 
20 21 
TABLE 2 
PERMIT PRICES WITH AND WITHOUT NATURAL GAS DECONTROLa 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Tons/Day ( 2 .5%S) ( l .0%S) (0 .5%S) (0. 25%S) "High" "Actual" "Low" 
150 650 650 650 650 1000 2000 3600 
200 80 250 350 470 810 850 2720 
250 80 250 350 470 470 750 2020 
300 80 250 350 470 470 560 2000 
350 80 250 350 470 420 470 1300 
400 80 250 350 470 420 470 940 
450 80 250 350 470 420 470 850 
---
a Prices are in 1977 dollars per ton of SO equivalent. The four cases 
represent four assumptions about naturalxgas prices under decontrol. The 
numbers in parentheses are the sulfur content of the residual fuel oil at 
which the natural gas price is assumed to equilibrate. The "High" and "Low" 
cases represent conditions of high and low natural gas supply under the status 
quo (i. e. no decontrol) . "Actual" corresponds to actual 1980 fuel use 
patterns. 
and less regulation.13 In mid-1982, the two major California gas 
utilities were publicly advocating a national ceiling price for 
natural gas.14 In addition , there is further uncertainty about how 
severely gas supplies would be curtailed by a renaissance of gas 
regulation in the future, and how use priorities might be established 
if shortages like those that developed in the mid-1970s were to 
return. 
These uncertainties affect the desirability of a trad.able 
emissions permit system as seen by polluting firms. In a pure 
tradable permits system, the total number of permits that are issued 
constitutes a fixed upper bound to emissions. Hence, all of the 
uncertainty in the price and availability of natural gas is translated 
into uncertainty about the cost of compliance with enviromnental 
regulation. Regardless of the supply of natural gas, under the pure 
permits system none of the uncertainty over gas would translate to 
uncertainty about the air. 
The standard-setting system of enviromnental regulation as 
practiced today is quite different. Source-specific standards are 
usually input standards: a firm must install a scrubber, or use a 
low-sulfur fuel. Because the availability of natural gas is 
uncertain, regulators do not require its use. In Loe Angeles, for 
example, they require that some sources burn gas if it is available, 
or if not, use low-sulfur residual fuel oil. For electric utilities, 
the basic requirement is to use residual fuel oil that has .25 percent 
sulfur content by weight. This means that total emissions under 
current standards are dependent on the availability of natural gas. 
22 
The 197 7 standards, for example, would produce about 420 tons per day 
of so2-equivalent under the conditions of gas availability that 
threatened to emerge in the mid -1 970s, but are producing only about 
350 tons per day now, and might result in as little as 250 tons per 
day if gas were totally deregulated. This means that in the current 
regulatory environment, both environmental quality and total abatement 
costs bear some of the uncertainty of natural gas availability. Thus, 
to make tradable the permits that are implicit in some baseline rate 
of emissions changes the distribution of the burden of this 
uncertainty by placing more of it on polluting firms. 
Tradable emissions permits systems can be designed to avoid 
this problem, but the solution is surely a move away from the pristine 
market solution. There are two basic avenues by which the problem can 
be approached. One is to have the face value of a permit (e.g. the 
quantity of S02-equivalent emissions that it allows) depend on the 
availability of natural gas. A permits market would then be a series 
of contingent claims markets, subject to a continuing regulatory 
determination of the state of natural gas supply that has emerged and 
hence the emissions value of the permits. The variability in total 
emissions under existing standards could then be incorporated directly 
into variability in permit values. This , of course, is easier 
postulated than executed. It greatly complicates the permits market, 
and introduces what is sure to be a ti.me-consuming , expensive and 
controversial process -- determining the state of gas availability. 
Tne second alternative is to overlay gas usage requirements 
a system of regulations -- on the permits holdings. The permits 
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market would be relied upon to establish long-run allocations of 
emissions that would apply under pessimistic assumptions about gas 
availability. In the short run, holders of these permits might be 
subjected to additional gas-burning requirements if gas is available, 
as is now the case. As long as gas is less expensive than low-sulfur 
oil, this is not likely to be resisted by regulated entities. 
Nevertheless, such a system will not allow the market to produce a 
given level of total emissions at minimum cost. The reason is that 
gas-burning standards are unlikely to achieve mini.mum cost even if 
that is the regulatory objective for the same reasons that current 
regulations do not produce a mini.mum-cost solution. Regulators are 
simply unlikely to possess sufficient information to enable them to 
simulate a competitive market in their regulatory requirements. 
Perhaps a more likely approach is to adopt a permits system 
that effectively puts a firm ceiling on emissions, but which also has 
a standard procedure for adjusting the number of outstanding permits. 
Environmental policy to date has tended to accept an absolutist 
rhetoric with respect to air quality objectives: that air quality 
targets should be set on the basis of health standards and other gross 
effects, and independently of compliance costs. The artifacts of this 
approach are uniform national ambient air quality standards for major 
pollutants, despite substantial regional differences in the difficulty 
of achieving them, and nationwide NSPS that are uniform except for 
usually minor differences between PSD regions and nonattainment areas. 
As a conceptual matter, the alternative is to approach 
environmental policy more as a matter of practical economics. 
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According to this approach, enviromnental policy objectives, such as 
ceilings on total emissions and ambient air quality standards, ought 
to depend in part on costs. Higher abatements costs owing to rising 
prices or, under regulation, declining availability of natural gas 
ought to affect the objectives of the policy. Source-specific 
standards, by letting changes in natural gas supplies affect air 
quality as well as compliance costs, actually do this, and are not 
really consistent with the absolutist position taken in enviromnental 
legislation. 
As time progresses, it is likely that nl.Dllerous factors will 
change the politically determined goals of enviromnental policy. 
Natural gas issues are part of the larger issue of the costs of 
abatement. In addition, knowledge about the effects of pollution and 
the attitudes of citizens about the social priority to be given 
enviromnental policy are also likely to change over time. 
Consequently, there is likely to be persistent uncertainty about the 
stringency of enviromnental regulation for many reasons. One natural 
way to accommodate this uncertainty is to focus the regulatory process 
on periodic reappraisals of ceilings on total emissions. 
Periodic revision of the Clean Air Act, occasioned by the 
sunset provision of the law, does this only imperfectly. for it 
focuses attention on general statements of policy and the approach to 
regulation, rather than the actual choice of an enviromnental policy 
objective. An alternative approach is to have a regular expiration 
date for some significant portion of permits in each region in which a 
tradable emissions policy is adopted. Regulators would undertake a 
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formal regulatory process to decide how many new permits would be 
created to replace the expiring ones. Evidence would be taken on 
changes in compliance costs (including the availability of natural 
gas) , new knowledge about the effects of pollution, and additional 
information about the relationship between emissions and air quality, 
as well as in overall policy objectives as enunciated in current 
versions of the statutes. Because these proceedings, including 
subsequent predictable legal challenges, would consl.Dlle considerable 
time, they would be undertaken only every few years. For example, a 
permit life of ten years could be adopted, with half of the permits 
expiring every five years. 
This approach could be combined with the Zero Revenue Auction 
described in Section I. Here new permits would be provisionally 
allocated on the basis of holdings of expiring permits, but an auction 
process would be used to reallocate them. 
The system of periodically expiring permits does not fully 
address the problem that natural gas regulation creates for the 
implementation of tradable emissions permits. In the short run, at 
least, emissions ceilings would be fixed, and exogenous shocks to the 
system would be absorbed completely by changes in compliance costs. 
But the proposal does focus the attention of the regulatory process 
on periodic reassessment of emissions ceilings in light of new 
information about the costs and benefits of regulation. 
III. PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
The generation of electric power in thermal facilities that 
burn coal or oil is arguably the most important source of air 
pol lution. Certainly for sul fur oxides emissions this is the case; 
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approximately half of the sulfur oxides emitted in Los Angeles is the 
result of combustion of oil for generating electricity.15 Obviously 
the performance of any approach to control ling air pollution will 
depend heavily on its effectiveness with respect to emissions by 
electric utilities. 
Incentive-based approaches to enviromnental control rely upon 
the cost-minimizing objective of regulated firms to achieve an 
efficLent al location of abatement responsibil ities among sources. The 
assumption that electric utilities will minimize costs, however, is 
debatable. One reason is that public utility regulation is interposed 
between the actual technical opportunities and real costs of a utility 
and the smount of revenue that a util ity is permitted to extract from 
its customers. If utility regulators are more likely to allow some 
kinds of costs than others, or are wil ling to let utilities earn 
greater profits on some kinds of assets than others, the utility 
regulatory process wil l cause the regulated firm to depart from cost-
minimizing choices of technology and operating methods. 
In general, public util ity regulators have been quite 
deferential to enviromnental regulation. In California, for example, 
the Public Util ities Commission has adopted the pol icy that a utility 
facility is not to be regarded as an electric generation plant and a 
separate pollution abatement plant, but that for purposes of 
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ratemaking they are to be considered one and the same, with identical 
. . 1 f l" d . . 16 prLncLp es o cost recovery app Le to each actLvLty. For most 
categories of enviromnental expenses, this approach means that public 
utility regulation distorts incentives no more than for other utility 
activities. But for tradable permits, the policy of identical 
ratemaking principles can be disastrous, depending on how the policy 
is implemented. 
In most states the original cost approach is used for 
incorporating the costs of capital investments into the rate base of a 
regulated utility. Firms are al lowed to recover annual depreciation 
plus a profit that is calculated by multiplying the allowed rate of 
return and the current deprecLated book value of the original 
expenditure on capital facilities which the regulators have declared 
to be "used and useful" for public utility purposes. An alternative 
is the replacement cost method, whereby the book value of the asset is 
adjusted to account for inflation and changes in technology that would 
cause the actual value of an old facility to depart from its 
depreciated original cost. As a practical matter, the two approaches 
yield essential ly the same results, for states using a method that 
produces lower estimates of the current value of capital assets tend 
to adopt allowed rates of return that are compensatingly higher.17 
The neutrality of ratemaking methods is not likely to carry 
over to tradable emissions permits unless they are allocated by 
auction. If grandfathering is used, the initial position of the 
utility will be permits that had zero acquisition cost, and hence that 
must be carried on the books in original cost states at zero value. 
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No adjustment of the rate of return allowed on this asset can produce 
anything other than a zero profit allowance. 
A second problem is the treatment of capital gains and losses 
in utility accounts. Most states use the principles in the Uniform 
System of Accounts established by the Federal Power Commission. This 
requires that any gains or losses from the sale of an asset, 
calculated as the difference between sales price and book value for 
ratemaking purposes, be passed on to ratepayers through adjustments in 
utility prices.18 In original cost states, this amounts to a 100 
percent tax on the sales revenue if a utility decides to sell a 
grandfathered permit. In practice, if a utility sold permits for the 
purpose of making further abatement expenditures, its revenue 
requirements would change by the difference in operating expenditures 
plus the profit on investments for additional abatement and the 
revenue from permit sales. Obviously, this would be negative if the 
utility faced lower marginal abatement costs than was typical in the 
airshed. Hence, the capital gains provisions provide an important 
disincentive to make warranted further expenditures on abatement. 
Periodic auctions provide an appropriate incentive structure 
for utilities. Expenditures on multiyear permits enter as capital 
assets on which the firm can earn profits, and the periodicity of the 
auctions keeps the book value of the permits near market value even in 
original cost states. The problem, of course, is that a standard 
auction faces the same resistance among utilities and their regulators 
as it faces elsewhere: the auction increases the capitalization 
requirements of the utility, even if it changes neither the operating 
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capacity of the utility nor its abatement expenditures and emissions. 
The problem is somewhat worse in the utility sector, however, in that 
it would be the source of political opposition within the govermnent 
(the utility regulators). Moreover, since the increase in interest 
rates in the early 1970s, utilities have normally faced higher 
marginal capital costs than their average cost of capital. This leads 
to even more resistance to new capitalization requirements. 
The Zero Revenue Auction is sufficiently far from any 
institution that public utility regulators have ever had to face that 
it is somewhat uncertain how they would treat the permits acquired 
through it. Certainly any net sale of permits by a utility would most 
likely be subjected to the provisions for total capture of capital 
gains. Because the Zero Revenue Auction also produces a final 
allocation based upon a publicly determined market process, it would 
be natural to use it to value the final permit holdings of the utility 
for ratemaking purposes. The problem is that if the new permits are 
to be regarded as acquired at these prices, it is also natural to 
regard the provisional allocation to have been sold at these prices 
and, because they were grandfathered, to be subject to total capture 
by ratepayers. If so, the firm would have to make a net reduction in 
rates, equal to the difference between gross sales of the provision 
permits and the profits allowed on the gross purchase of new permits. 
Like the standard auction, this succeeds in decapitalizing the firm. 
In replacement cost states, none of the problems described 
above would arise. The current price of permits would be used to 
readjust their value for ratemaking purposes. Their sale would 
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generate a cash reserve for undertaking offsetting abatement 
investments, for other investment purposes, or for transfer to 
nonutility accounts in what amounts to a reduction in the 
capitalization of the utility. 
The obvious solution to the problem is to convince original-
cost states to adopt replacement-cost methods for evaluating emissions 
permits. Unfortunately, there are reasons to doubt that utility 
regulators will be enthusiastic about this proposal, The history of 
the original-cost approach is grounded in the reluctance of utility 
regulators to introduce any element of speculation into utility 
planning, or to allow intangible assets to enter the rate base in any 
. "f . 19 signi icant amount. For example, regulators do not want utilities 
to speculate in land acquired for facilities and rights of way; hence 
the tendency to want all capital gains on land transactions to be 
passed through to ratepayers. 
The argument that will be used against allowing emissions 
perinits to enter the rate base at replacement cost will be like the 
argument for recapturing speculative land gains. The utility paid 
nothing for the permit other than costs that were already allowed in 
participating in the enviromnental regulatory process and complying 
with the resulting regulations, Rising permit values are a windfall 
gain that ought not to be capitalized in the assets of the firm, and 
that should be returned to ratepayers if ever captured through sale. 
The counterargument is that utilities ought to face the proper 
incentive to strike the most efficient balance between emissions and 
abatement. But similar arguments about assets such as land and water 
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rights and about other intangible assets have been unsuccessful in the 
past, since they have conflicted with the overall aim of regulators to 
bold down utility prices to consl.DD.ers. Thus, it is entirely plausible 
that .!!!.Y. method of allocating permits and making them tradable will 
result in public utility decisions that remove much of the incentive 
for participation by utilities. 
In the specific case of sulfur oxides emissions in Los 
Angeles, public utilities have been forced to engage in more extensive 
20 abatement than have most other sources. Hence, we would expect that
in a grandfathered system, utilities would seek to increase permit 
holdings, rather than decrease them, They would then use permits to 
increase the sulfur content of the fuel used in electric generation 
facilities. Their expenditures on a net increase in permits would 
then allow a reduction in fuel costs, and could be treated as a 
capital expenditure on which the firm could earn profits. Regulators 
would not need to let the "old" (grandfathered) perinics into the rate 
base in order for utilities to face appropriate incentives in deciding 
bow many additional permits to acquire. Thus, the Zero Revenue 
Auction, with public utility regulators allowing only the net change 
in permit holdings at the auction price into the rate base, poses no 
special problems for this specific case. 
This happy state of affairs depends on an initial situation in 
which utilities are overregulated. States in which utilities ought to 
abate more relative to other sources and that use original cost as the 
method for evaluating assets face a significant political problem in 
trying to implement tradable emissions permits. 
32 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Walt Kelley, the author of the famous carton strip, "Pogo, " 
once gave the immortal line to one of his characters: "We have met 
the enemy, and they are us." The problem of regulatory interactions 
deserves such a line. Other aspects of regulatory policies can create 
serious political problems in trying to implement a reform in any 
particular area and can lead to an inefficient market outcome. 
Tradable emissions permits are clearly an idea on the 
ascendency. The Enviromnental Protection Agency continues 
periodically to issue policy guidelines that expand the applicability 
of the concept, and that reduce the bureaucratic barriers to 
implementing it. The California Air Resources Board is actively 
pursuing the possibility of experimenting with a full-blown market for 
sulfur oxides emissions somewhere in the state. Yet these initiatives 
face serious opposition because of their relationship to other 
regulatory policies: the constraints imposed by new source 
performance standards, the implicit wealth created by existing 
permits, the uncertainties in the future of fuel supplies and prices 
owing to regulation in those areas, and the practices of utility 
regulators that are likely to guide the decisions about how permit 
values will be incorporated into the rate base of electric utilities. 
The solution to these problems in a technical sense is 
straightforward. In our work on designing a market for controlling 
sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles, we have demonstrated how the 
wealth distribution issue can be directly incorporated into the design 
of a permits market. The Zero Revenue Auction can distribute permits 
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efficiently and accomplish whatever wealth distribution regulators 
would like to have. The uncertainties about the effect of the state 
of natural gas regulation (and regulation of other fuels should it be 
reinstated ) can also be taken into account in designing a market
institution that lets the burden of bearing this uncertainty be 
periodically reviewed in a more flexible regulatory regime. Finally, 
utility regulators can adopt replacement cost methods or other cost­
accounting techniques that give utilities appropriate incentives to 
participate effectively in an emissions permit market. 
These solutions require that tradable emissions permits be 
implemented in a manner that is a more comprehensive departure from 
the status quo than are the controlled trading options that have been 
developed by EPA. The evolution of controlled trading seems to be to 
expand gradually the range of allowable trades. Two examples are the 
extension of the bubble concept to multiple plants, and the evolution 
of the offset policy to emissions reduction banks. This incremental 
approach deals effectively with only one of the issues raised in this 
paper: it preserves the wealth created by current standards by using 
them as a baseline from which trades can be made. On pure efficiency 
grounds, the merits of the incremental approach can be questioned, for 
there are reasons to believe that the resulting permits market will 
not produce a competitive allocation of permits and, hence, will not 
minimize abatement costs or substantially facilitate the process of 
technical and economic change. But even in the absence of these 
structural problems, the issue of interactions between permits markets 
and energy regulation -- fuels and utilities -- remains. Without 
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explicitly designing a permits policy to account for these problems, 
the benefits of this reform are likely to be substantially less than 
they could be. 
The analysis in this paper focuses on a specific reform 
proposal, the implementation of tradable permits for sulfur oxides in 
Los Angeles. Yet this case illustrates a more general class of 
problems in trying to introduce changes in regulatory policy that 
contribute to economic efficiency. The economics literature on 
regulation correctly focuses on the efficiency implications of 
alternative regulatory regimes, and uses traditional tools of welfare 
economics to aggregate the benefits and costs of reform proposals to 
identify the most efficient policy. Typically these analyses assume 
that all other policies and institutions remain unchanged, and 
overlook the distributional impact of proposed reforms. The case 
study reported here illustrates two important points: (1) the 
contribution to economic ef fic1ency of a proposed reform can be 
greatly influenced by the state of other regulatory policies, and (2) 
the effects of a change in policy on the distribution of wealth can be 
very large in comparison to the improvement in economic efficiency. 
To the extent that effective political resistance to a change in 
policy is motivated by the economic gains and losses of well-organized 
groups, successful reform may require that considerable additional 
work be undertaken to design a policy that not only contributes to 
economic efficiency but also provides some amelioration of the ' 
redistributional effects. Most often the method of amelioration that 
is considered is compensation; however, as this paper illustrates, 
another potential candidate is to design the institutions of the 
reformed regulatory regime in a way that preserves some part of the 
old private equities. This strikes us as an approach that has 
received insufficient attention in the literature on regulatory 
policy. 
35 
36 3 7  
FOOTNOTES 
1. For a more complete discussion of the nature of these reforms and 
some problems with them, see Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. Noll, 
"Implementing Tradable Emissions Permits, " in Reforming Social 
Regulation, edited by LeRoy Graymer and Frederick Thompson 
( Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982). 
2. For an interesting and thorough discussion of this approach, see 
John Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press , 196 8). 
3. Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. Noll, "Designing a Market for 
Tradable Emissions Permits, " in Reform of Environmental 
Regu lation, edited by Wesley Magat (Cambridge: Bal linger, 1982); 
and Glen R. Cass, Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. Noll, Implementing 
Tradable Emissions Permits for Su lfur Oxides Emissions in the 
South Coast Air Basin : Final Report to the California Air 
Resources Board (June 30 , 1 982). 
4. For a discussion of the legal position of emissions permits, see 
James E. Krier, "Some Legal Aspects of Tradable Emissions Permits 
for Air Pollution in Southern California, " Chapter 4, Vol. II of 
Cass, Hahn and Noll, supra Note 3 .
5. B. A. Ackerman and W. T. Hassler, C lean Coal/Dirty Air (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
6. Robert W. Crandal l ,  "Controlling Industrial Pollution: The 
Economics and Politics of Clean Air, " in Regu latory Reform in 
Pub lic Utilities, edited by Michael Crew (Lexington, HA :
7 .  
Lexington Books, 1982). 
The estimated compliance cost under a market arrangement is 
probably biased upwards, and the short-run efficiency gain from a 
market biased downwards, to the extent that control methods are 
available that have not been incorporated into our abatement cost 
functions. Only abatement methods for which we could obtain 
documentation in public sources have been included ; this causes 
us to exclude changes in production processes that are available 
to firms but are trade secrets, and control methoas available to 
sources that have not yet been regul ated. In addition, long-run 
efficiency gains will be greater to the extent that the market 
stimulates cost-saving innovations in abatement technology and 
reduces barriers to economic change. 
8. Hahn and Holl, supra Note 3. 
9. See, for example, Paul W. MacAvoy, "The Regulation-Induced 
Shortage of Natural Gas, " Bell Journal of Economics 4 (Autumn
1 973) : 45 4-498.
38 
10. Glen R .  Cass, "The Sulfur Oxides :Emissions Potential of the South 
Coast Air Basin in the Early 1 980s, " Appendix E, Vol .  III of 
Cass, Hahn and Noll, supra Note 3. 
1 1 .  Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Division of Energy 
Regulation, "A Study of Alternatives to the Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1 97 8, " U . S. Department of Energy, November 1 981, Document 
DOE /PE-003 1 ;  and Energy Information Administration, 1981 Annual 
Report to Congress . Volume 3: Energy Projections, U. S .  
Department o f  Energ y, Document DOE /EIA-0 173( 81) 13, February 1982 . 
Both studies are based on the assumption of deregulation of gas 
in 1982. 
1 2. The price of a permit in the first case -- a limit of 1 50 tons 
per day � is unaffected by natural gas prices in a deregulated 
natural gas enviromnent because substitution of gas for oil 
burning is no longer a marginal abatement strategy at this 
emissions ceiling. At all other ceilings on abatement, the 
extent of gas burning is affected by its price, 
13. For a history of the ever-changing politics of natural gas
regulation, see M .  Elizabeth Sanders, The Regulation of Natural 
Gas: Policy and Politics, 1938-1978 (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1981) . 
1 4 .  Los Angeles Times, August 7 ,  1982, p. 24 . 
1 5 .  Glen R. Cass, "Methods for Sulfate Air Quality Management With 
Applications to Los Angeles, " Ph.D.  dissertation, California 
Institute of Technology, 1 978. 
1 6 .  Decision 897 1 1, California Public Utilities Commission 1 97 7 .  
17 . Walter Primeaux, "Rate Base Methods and Realized Rates of 
Return, " Economic Inquiry 1 6  (March 1978) : 95-107 . 
39 
18. Uniform System of Accounts, Federal Energy Regulatory COIIDllission, 
1 973, PP • 101-1 1 0 .
1 9 .  For a more complete discussion o f  the lessons for dealing with 
tradable permits to be found in the treatment of intangible 
assets by utility regulators, see James M .  Gerard, "The Effects 
of Public Utility Regulation on the Efficiency of a Market for 
Emissions Permits, " Chapter 5, Vol. II of Cass, Hahn and Noll, 
supra Note 3 .  
20. For a calculation of the change in permit holdings b y  utilities 
under various assumptions about the ceiling on total emissions 
and the availability of natural gas, see Hahn and Noll, supra 
Note 3. 
